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BOOK REVIEWS
800 MILES TO VALDEZ: THE BUILDING OF THE ALASKA PIPELINE. By
James P. Roscow. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1977.
THE ALASKA PIPELINE: THE POLITICS OF OIL AND NATIVE LAND
CLAIMS. By Mary Clay Berry. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana Univ.
Press, 1975.
Reviewed by DAVID E. LINDGREN*
The Trans-Alaska Pipeline has been an accomplished fact for
three years. Many see it as a permanent intrusion through the great
wilderness between the Yukon River and Prudhoe Bay. To others, it is
the means of United States' access to the substantial petroleum reserves
of the North Slope, currently delivering 1.5 million barrels of domestic
oil daily to domestic markets.' A third perspective is that of the State
of Alaska, for by making commercial production possible on the Slope,
the pipeline indirectly provides the state with royalty and tax revenues
which are projected to exceed $3 billion annually.2 No matter what
one's vantage, James P. Roscow's observation that the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline "breeds superlatives" remains apt.3
* A.B., 1960, Stanford University; J.D., 1963, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley; member, California and District of Columbia Bars.
I. Telephone Interview with John Ratterman, Manager of Public Affairs, Alyeska Pipeline
Service Co. (April 30, 1980). This quantity, which eventually will increase to 2 million barrels per
day, constitutes 17.6 percent of U.S. daily production (8.514 million barrels, U.S. Dept. of Energy,
Monthly Energy Review 28 (March 1980)) and is equivalent to 18.3 percent of United States
imports (8.212 million barrels per day, Id. at 30). At 1980 world oil prices of $29.70 per barrel,
U.S. Dept. of Energy, Weekly Petroleum Status Report 39 (May 9, 1980), oil transported through
the pipeline each year would have an aggregate value of $16.3 billion.
2. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 12, 1980, at 82.
3. J. Roscow, 800 MILES TO VALDEZ: THE BUILDING OF THE ALASKA PIPELINE 3 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as J. Roscow, 800 MILES].
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The pipeline has inspired several books, two of which are James
Roscow's 800 Ailes to Valdez and Mary Clay Berry's The Alaska Pe-
line. They are contemporary, popular histories of the pipeline, one
published prior to its completion and the other very shortly afterwards.
Both employ the now common reportorial technique of frequent quota-
tion of contemporary conversations and statements, which may or may
not have occurred, in order to increase the human dimension of the
story.
The story is rooted in the remarkable history of the pipeline, and
the significance of these two books can best be understood with some
recollection of the main benchmarks of its history. As domestic petro-
leum production began to enter a period of decline, oil was discovered
at Prudhoe Bay in early 1968. In 1969, the Trans-Alaska Pipeline pro-
ject was announced, and applications for rights-of-way across federal
lands were filed with the Department of Interior in June of that year.'
Ten months later, in April 1970, plaintiffs in two separate lawsuits ob-
tained preliminary injunctions barring any grant of the right-of-way by
the government. One injunction was awarded to a Native Alaskan vil-
lage because the pipeline would cross lands subject to the village's ab-
original claims.' The other was issued to three environmental
organizations which contended that the proposed right-of-way was
wider than permitted by the Mineral Leasing Act and that, in any
event, the Department of Interior had not prepared an environmental
impact statement pursuant to the recently enacted National Environ-
mental Policy Act.'
During the next two years, parallel efforts continued to settle both
the Native Alaskan land claims and the environmental controversy
over the pipeline. The former were resolved by the Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act in December of 1971. 7 Resolution of the envi-
ronmental issue, however, consumed more time. The Department of
4. Id. at 21, 23. The applications were filed under section 28 of the Mineral Leasing Act, 30
U.S.C. § 185 (1970) (current version at 30 U.S.C. § 185a-185y (1976)), which authorizes the Secre-
tary of the Interior to grant rights-of-way through public lands for oil or natural gas purposes.
5. Native Village v. Hickel, Civ. No. 706-70 (D.D.C., Apr. 1, 1970) (order granting prelimi-
nary injunction). The action was filed by several villages that had claims along the pipeline route,
but the injunction ran only in favor of Stevens Village, the only village which had been organized
under § 16 of the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1976). The case was eventually
settled.
6. Wilderness Society v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970) (order granting preliminary
injunction).
7. Act of Dec. 18, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1061,
1601-1628 (1976)) (current version at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978)).
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the Interior published a 246 page draft environmental impact statement
in January of 1971. Extensive public hearings followed in Washington
and Anchorage, and in April of 1972 a six volume final statement, sup-
plemented by a three volume economic analysis, was issued.8 On May
11, 1972, Interior Secretary Morton announced his decision to issue
rights-of-way for the pipeline "as soon as it is legally permissible to do
so,"9 thereby returning the matter to the courts. The district court
thereupon promptly dissolved the outstanding preliminary injunc-
tion.' ° The court of appeals, however, sitting en banc, reversed and
reinstated the injunction." The Supreme Court then denied certiorari
on April 2, 1973.12
Having now run the gamut of the judicial as well as the executive
branch, the pipeline moved into the legislative branch. There, the ad-
ministration already had proposed an omnibus legislative package to
modernize the Department of the Interior's land management and min-
eral leasing authorities, and incidentally, to cure the effect of the court
of appeals decision.' 3 Congress responded rapidly, albeit with legisla-
tion far more specific and narrower in scope. The Trans-Alaska Pipe-
line Authorization Act became law on November 16, 1973,14 just one
month after the Arab oil embargo. The Department of the Interior is-
sued the actual right-of-way on January 23, 1974,15 and construction
8. J. Roscow, 800 MILES, supra note 3, at 79; M. BERRY, THE ALASKA PIPELINE: THE
POLITICS OF OIL AND NATIVE LAND CLAIMS 217, 228 (1975) [hereinafter cited as M. BERRY, THE
ALASKA PIPELINE].
9. Applications for Pipeline Right-of-Way and Ancillary Land Uses-Prudhoe Bay to
Valdez, Alaska; Application by State of Alaska for Right-of-Way for Highway; Statement of Rea-
sons for Approval 45 (May 11, 1972).
10. Wilderness Society v. Morton, Civ. No. 928-70 (D.D.C., fied Aug. 15, 1972) (order dis-
solving injunction and dismissing complaint).
11. Wilderness Society v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The court unanimously
held that because all construction activities could not be confined to an area 25 feet on either side
of the pipeline, a grant of a right-of-way would violate § 28 of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920,30
U.S.C. § 185 (1970) (current version at 30 U.S.C. § 185a-185y (1976)) which states: "[r]ights-of-
way. . . may be granted. . . for pipeline purposes ... to the extent of the ground occupied by
the said pipeline and twenty-five feet on each side of the same . 479 F.2d at 847.
12. 411 U.S. 917 (1973).
13. S. REP. No. 93-207, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2458-67. Part of this legislation was the precursor of the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-579, §§ 101-707, 90 Stat. 2744 (codified in scattered sections
of titles 7, 10, 16, 22, 25, 30, 33, 40, 42, 43, 48, and 49 U.S.C.). The remaining portion, a reform of
the Mining Law of 1872, codified in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C. (beginning with § 22) (1976 &
Supp. 11 1978) has yet to be enacted by Congress.
14. Act of Nov. 16, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-153, 87 Stat. 576 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1976),
43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1655 (1976), and in scattered titles of U.S.C.).
15. Agreement and Grant of Right-of-Way for Trans-Alaska Pipeline between the United
States of America and Amerada Hess Corp., ARCO Pipe Line Co., Exxon Pipeline Co., Mobil
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activity began immediately. The pipeline was completed in mid-
1977. 16
Each of the authors has selected a different aspect of this history
for concentrated treatment, the choice being, in part, the product of the
assumptions and biases with which the authors began and which af-
fected their perceptions of the significance, and the reality, of the events
being described. Mr. Roscow's bias, an obvious admiration for indus-
trial achievement, undoubtedly is the reason for his book; it is evident
from the excitement he finds in the pipeline's engineering challenges
and in his seeing events through the eyes, and "words," of those re-
sponsible for building the pipeline. 800 Miles to Valdez is a layman's
history of how the technological problems posed by the unique and
harsh Alaskan arctic environment and by the sheer magnitude of the
world's costliest project were overcome. Mr. Roscow describes all of
these, ice-rich permafrost, otherwise unstable soils, extreme seismicity,
difficult mountain passes, massive ice movements on the Yukon,
revegetation of the tundra, passage of wildlife over (or under) the pipe-
line, even the fiasco of the falsified weld records, as problems which
had to be, and eventually were, surmounted. He does not give consid-
eration to the belief of environmentalists that these problems might be
reasons to question the very concept of an Alaskan pipeline. Thus, Mr.
Roscow's book is, in a sense, a paean to pipeliners, which leaves one
with an understanding of what an engineering accomplishment the
pipeline truly is.
This view of the pipeline, however, also creates the book's basic
weakness, a failure to examine events to determine if another, and
more obscure, reality might be hiding behind them. The matter of
quality control during the line's construction is one such instance. Al-
though Mr. Roscow notes that "this project by dint of the federal gov-
ernment has a high quality control requirement,"' 7 his discussion of the
matter gives the impression that, apart from the problem of the falsified
weld records of a subcontractor, quality control was essentially a mat-
ter left to Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, the owner's arm for
building and operating the line. But, the role of the federal government
during construction was continuing and pervasive. The Agreement and
Grant of Right-of-Way between the government and the owners con-
Alaska Pipeline Co., Phillips Petroleum Co., Sohio Pipe Line Co., and Union Alaska Pipeline Co.
(Jan. 23, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Agreement and Grant of Right-of-Way].
16. J. Roscow 800 MiLEs, supra note 3, at 94, 198.
17. Id. at 164.
[Vol. 15:855
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tained detailed environmental and technical stipulations, many of them
performance standards, which had to be met. In addition, Alyeska was
required, before commencing construction on any portion of the line,
first to submit to the federal government final designs, environmental
studies, data demonstrating that the stipulation requirements would be
met, and a "detailed network analysis diagram" covering, inter alia,
work scheduling and construction sequencing. Construction then could
proceed only after the government approved all of this by means of a
Notice to Proceed. The government also continually monitored con-
struction through an Authorized Officer, assisted by an engineering
contractor, who had extraordinary authority to order immediate sus-
pension of construction activity under a variety of circumstances."
Mr. Roscow, unfortunately, does not explore the effect of this fed-
eral presence or even, given the point of view from which he writes, the
opinions of Alyeska toward it. Was the stringent quality control pro-
gram a function of responsible corporate management, obviating the
necessity of extensive federal monitoring, or did federal compulsion
add to it? In retrospect, was it adequate, inadequate, or excessive?
Similarly, was the Notice to Proceed procedure an impediment to con-
struction, and to what extent, or did it have some salutory effect? Ques-
tions such as these would have been, and in fact still are, worth
exploring.
800 Miles to Valdez, then, is largely a history of the design and
construction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, with an occasional incursion
into the Alaskan Native and the clash between environmental preser-
vation and energy development which swirled around it. On the other
hand, Ms. Berry's The Alaska Ppeline centers on these two issues. De-
spite its primary title, the book is for the most part a history of the
Native claims and, to a lesser degree, a recounting of the three-way
environmental battles involving conservationists, oil companies, and
government. The book divides neatly into these two parts.
The first section is a noncritical history of the Alaskan Native
claims. It is noncritical in the sense that it does not examine their legal
foundation or the extent of the national moral obligation and brushes
over any distinctions between Alaskan Natives and Indians of the
lower forty-eight states.' 9 The book is, more precisely, an illuminating
18. Agreement and Grant of Right-of Way, supra note 15. The "Notice to Proceed" proce-
dure, including the required submittals, is set out in stipulation 1.7 of Exhibit D of the Agreement,
and the suspension authority is in § 25 of the Agreement.
19. For example, the author does not note that, of all the plaintiffs in Native Village v. Hick-
1980]
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treatise on the political process by which the Natives achieved a legisla-
tive settlement of their claims.
Ms. Berry recounts the multitude of disparate forces involved in
this legislative fight. Various Native groups' interests conflicted ac-
cording to the economic potential of the land which each claimed. The
environmentalists sought to preserve the Alaskan wilderness from de-
velopment by Native as well as by white men, while the Alaskan Shites
were intent on maintaining the paramount land selection right of the
state under the Alaska Statehood Act 20 and minimizing shifts in politi-
cal and economic power which a generous settlement would promote.
The oil companies' goal was a rapid settlement which maintained fed-
eral jurisdiction over the proposed pipeline corridor and did not jeop-
ardize their tenure under the North Slope oil leases. The Nixon
Administration was caught in the dilemma of the tension between its
Indian self-determination policy and the perceived need for prompt de-
velopment of the North Slope reserves. Finally, there were the quixotic
elements of Congress: a House subcommittee chairman with a bruised
ego and the on again, off again feud between the two Senators from
Alaska. Ms. Berry presents a fascinating insight into how these forces
interacted. Of particular interest is the manner by which lobbyists for
the companies and the Natives first came together, and then added
those labor unions whose members would be employed on the pipeline,
to form a successful tripartite coalition.
Having insightfully described the resolution of the Native claims,
Ms. Berry proceeds to chronicle the environmental conflict over au-
thorization of the pipeline. This element of the book, measured by its
brevity, is clearly secondary. It is also flawed by virtue of Ms. Berry's
shift from the analytical narrative of the political process she uses suc-
cessfully in discussing the Native claims to an assessment, which is at
best superficial, of the merits of the specific issues bound up in the envi-
ronmental controversy. The central question, in her view, was whether
the pipeline should be built at all-a question she complains was never
el, only Stevens Village had been organized under § 16 of the Indian Reorganization Act, 25
U.S.C. § 476 (1976), which conferred on the village the power "to prevent the sale, disposition,
lease or encumbrance of tribal lands. . . without the consent of the tribe .. " Moreover, while
25 U.S.C. § 323 (1976) broadly empowered the Secretary of the Interior to "grant rights-of-way
for all purposes, subject to such conditions as he may prescribe" over Indian lands, 25 U.S.C.
§ 324 (1976) prohibited him from doing so with respect to lands belonging to a tribe (or village),
such as Stevens Village, organized under the Indian Reorganization Act.
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answered. The difficulty is that she never attempts to do so either. In-
stead, her description of the issue has essentially a single dimension,
preservation of the "awesome and sobering" Alaskan wilderness. Ms.
Berry dismisses the energy supply-demand component of the issue as
insignificant; the petroleum which the pipeline would transport to do-
mestic markets is "a drop in the bucket of United States petroleum
needs" and the energy crisis which heightened the government's inter-
est in the pipeline was "more a matter of distribution than of actual
shortages."2
The "Canadian alternative,"22 with which Ms. Berry appears
enamoured, is dealt with in a similarly disingenuous fashion. She
again perceives the issue in strictly environmental terms, which, she
believes, favored construction of the line through Canada. Yet, what
made the North Slope discoveries so significant was not just their size
but the fact they were domestic reserves of the United States. A Cana-
dian pipeline, if Canada in fact would have permitted it, would have
diminished United States access to these reserves because Canada
would have required fifty percent of its capacity to be available for the
transportation of Canadian oil.23 Ms. Berry does not even mention this
facet of the issue, let alone balance it against the relevant competing
considerations.
This perhaps is the key to the major problem with this portion of
The Alaska P#peline, a problem it shares with many others that attempt
to deal with the merits of the frequently emotionally charged conflict
between preservation of an existing environment and exploitation of
21. M. BERRY, THE ALAsKA PIPELINE, supra note 8, at 147, 260.
22. Id. at 217.
23. Canada would have imposed four conditions:
(1) a majority of the equity interest in the line would have to be Canadian (in this con-
nection, ownership by a Canadian subsidiary of an American company would not qual-
ify as Canadian ownership); (2) the management would have to be Canadian; (3) a
major portion (at least 50%) of the capacity of the line would have to be reserved for the
transportation of Canadian-owned oil, with the primary objective being to carry Cana-
dian oil to Canadian-not United States-markets; and (4) at all times preference would
be given to Canadian-owned and controlled groups during the construction of the pro-
ject and in supplying materials .... The question, then, is not simply whether Canada
is willing to have a pipeline built through its territory (although no Canadian official has
ever said it is willing), but also whether the four requirements Canada would impose are
acceptable in light of the United States' national interest.
These four requirements are probably reasonable from the point of view of Ca-
nada's national interests. They are unacceptable from the point of view of our [United
States] national interests...
Letter from the Secretary of the Interior to the Chairman, Senate Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs (April 4, 1973), S. REP. No. 93-207, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in [1973]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2510.
1980]
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natural resources. The issues are multi-faceted, complex, and difficult.
The Alaskan pipeline, as Mr. Roscow notes in passing, involved a wide
range of momentous national issues. Ms. Berry writes about only one
of these, and The Alaska Pipeline must be viewed accordingly. But, in
this light, the book is just as fascinating as 800 Miles to Valdez, and
both can be commended to anyone with an interest in the history of the
Alaskan pipeline.
8
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THE INDIANS IN OKLAHOMA. By Rennard Strickland. Norman,
Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press 1980. Pp. vii, 171.
Reviewed by Carole Goldberg-Ambrose*
This book is one of a series devoted to the history of different eth-
nic and racial groups in the state of Oklahoma. The books in this col-
lection were not written especially for lawyers, but for anyone curious
about the experiences and contributions of Oklahomans with different
cultural origins.
Whatever may be the connection between law and the other
groups included in the series, however, there'is a powerful connection
between the law and the story of the Oklahoma Indians. Neither In-
dian history nor Indian law can be understood without the other. It is
therefore fitting that Professor Strickland, a much-honored lawyer as
well as historian, should have been called upon to relate what it means
and has meant to be an Indian in Oklahoma.
The symbiotic relationship between Indian law and history means
that the culture and experience of Oklahoma's Indians cannot be re-
lated apart from the legal enactments and administrative policies that
have been directed at them. As Professor Strickland demonstrates, the
law has not been a peripheral force in the history of Oklahoma's Indi-
ans. In its frequent interventions into the lives of these people, the law
has produced total upheavals, not minor tremors.
Like other ethnic groups in Oklahoma (but unlike most other Indi-
ans in the United States), most of Oklahoma's Indians are not indige-
nous to the area they now consider their home. Oklahoma's Indians
came to the state under legal circumstances not experienced by otherimmigrant groups. They were forced, tricked, or induced by treaty to
move to Oklahoma from Eastern reservations that had been guaran-
teed to them by earlier treaties. The new treaties promised these tribes
* B.A., Smith; J.D., Stanford; Professor, University of California at Los Angeles School of
Law; member, California Bar.
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a land of their own, theirs to hold communally and to govern free from
unwanted white settlement and interference. Thus, unlike other immi-
grant groups, the Indians in Oklahoma had a group recognition that
included acknowledgment of sovereign status and the right to remain
apart.
Professor Strickland's account of these legal developments, as well
as the federal government's subsequent legal efforts to strip Oklahoma
Indians of their land base, their rights of self-government, and their
culture, is neither exhaustive nor novel. What is so enormously valua-
ble, however, is his skillful interweaving of these legal events with the
development and expression of the Oklahoma Indians' character and
culture.' Professor Strickland draws on Indian authors, poets, and art-
ists, creates vivid vignettes of Indian domestic life at various points in
time, and provides an illuminating collection of photographs to elicit
understanding of the Oklahoma Indians, buffeted as they have been by
Anglo law and policy. The adjustments attendant on removal to a new
land and loss of the old; the flourishing of tribal culture and govern-
ment under conditions of isolation and protection prior to the Civil
War; the dislocations and disruptions accompanying the forced change
of livelihoods and status during the period of forced selling and allot-
ting of land; the efforts to maintain group identity and cohesion follow-
ing the Interior Department's persistent effort to dismantle tribal
institutions; and the renewal of tribal self-consciousness and pride in
the wake of legal victories reinstating tribal governments and compen-
sating for land losses,-are told through evocative and moving sources.
The reader is required to confront laws and bureaucratic practices not
as self-contained systems, but as potent forces determining and altering
individual lives.
By relying so heavily on Indian .writers and artists, Professor
Strickland may not be giving us a wholly accurate picture of the
Oklahoma Indian experience. At one point in the narrative he even
acknowledges this possibility. To show how the late nineteenth century
efforts by the federal government to destroy Indian culture affected the
Indians, Professor Strickland offers a description of Indian boarding
school life by a young Kiowan named Koba, or the Wild Horse. "I
1. Actually, as Professor Strickland ably explains, there are some significant variations
among the Indian groups in Oklahoma, particularly between the so-called Five Civilized Tribes
that settled in eastern Oklahoma, and the plains Indians that settled in the western portion of the
state. Professor Strickland makes the reader aware of this diversity, while also depicting the com-
mon experiences and ways of life.
[Vol. 15:863
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pray everyday," Koba wrote, "and hoe onions." Professor Strickland
follows this quotation with a generalization about the impact of federal
reeducation programs, but notes that "Koba, an early Indian artist,
may have sensed the transformation in more dramatic terms than other
Oklahoma Indians."2 Professor Strickland's announced assumption is
that a lithograph or a poem can speak "in a way that a dozen sociologi-
cal and economic surveys could never do.' 3 He may be correct if the
proper literary or artistic work is selected. Fortunately, Professor
Strickland's choices can be accepted with confidence, for his body of
prior legal and historical writing4 testifies to his knowledge of the socio-
logical and economic literature he minimizes.5
One consequence of Professor Strickland's choice of sources is that
he introduces the reader to a variety of Indian literary and artistic
figures in the course of relating what they have to say about the
Oklahoma Indians' experience. Without reciting a list of cultural
achievements by Oklahoma Indians, he makes the reader aware of
them. Another imaginative device he uses to convey information indi-
rectly is the metaphor of the calendar. He divides Oklahoma Indian
history into seasons of the year, with the period from removal until the
Civil War era as autumn, the period of forced allotment and tribal dis-
mantlement between the Civil War and World War II as winter, and
the post-War period, particularly the past ten years, as a springtime of
renewal for tribal government and culture. Although there are not
enough distinctive historical eras to provide a comparable chapter for
summer, the device nevertheless is effective because it communicates
an Indian way of thinking about subjects--connecting them with natu-
ral phenomena-as well as the spirit that prevailed at different times of
Oklahoma Indians' history. Professor Strickland's masterful utilization
of such multi-purpose material is what enables him to provide so much
understanding in such a slim volume. "
For lawyers, the most valuable aspect of the book may be its ca-
pacity to illuminate not only how law has affected Indian people, but
how the experience and culture of people have affected law. For exam-
2. R. STRICKLAND, THE INDIANS IN OKLAHoMA 41-42 (1980).
3. Id. at xiii.
4. Eg., R. STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE SPIRITS: CHEROKEE LAW FROM CLAN TO COURT
(1975); B. PIERCE & R. STRICKLAND, THE CHEROKEE PEOPLE (1973); J. GREGORY & R. STRICK-
LAND, AMERICAN INDIAN SPIRIT TALES (1974). This is only a partial listing of Professor Strick-
lands extensive writings in the area of Indian law.
5. Notwithstanding his professed dissatisfaction with such material, Professor Strickland
does include some valuable demographic tables and maps.
1980]
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ple, in Harjo v. Kleppe,6 a'watershed case for Oklahoma Indians de-
cided in 1976, the issue was whether Congress had abolished all but
two offices of the Creek tribal government. Federal District Court
Judge Bryant prefaced his lengthy opinion by noting that "[m]ore than
is sometimes the case, the legal analysis necessary to unravel the statu-
tory tangle present here is inextricably bound up with the social, politi-
cal, and economic history of the times from which the legislation
emerged."7 His statement is true of most issues in Indian law. To un-
derstand cases and legislation that may have bearing on present legal
disputes, it is essential that one appreciate the condition of the particu-
lar Indian tribe at the time the case was decided or legislation enacted,
and the goals and practices of the Bureau of Indian Affairs bureaucracy
at that time. Although venerable legal precedents exist protecting
Indian rights of self-government and depriving states of authority over
Indian reservations,8 application of those precedents has depended
upon the strength and operation of tribal institutions of self-
government. Where meaningful tribal self-government is lacking,
courts have been much more willing to acknowledge state powers over
Indians, thereby compromising claims of tribal sovereignty. What Pro-
fessor Strickland's book reveals is how closely the Bureau of Indian
Affairs came to eradicating tribal institutions in Oklahoma during the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries through boarding schools,
law and order codes, and destruction of the land base. Some of the
Bureau's activities were carried out with Congressional authorization.
Others constituted what Judge Bryant went so far as to call "bureau-
cratic imperialism, manifested . . . in deliberate attempts to frustrate,
debilitate, and generally prevent from functioning the tribal govern-
ments expressly preserved by [federal legislation]." 9
Professor Strickland's focus on the Indians rather than the federal
bureaucrats causes him to omit many of the sordid facts detailed in the
Harjo v. Kleppe opinion and other recent cases. 10 By showing the de-
moralizing effect the Bureau had on Oklahoma's Indians, however, he
provides a context for understanding some of the case law involving
Oklahoma Indians. For example, several twentieth century Supreme
6. 420 F. Supp. 1110 (D.D.C. 1976), af'd, 581 F.2d 949 (D.C.Cir. 1978).
7. 420 F. Supp. at 1118-19.
8. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet. 1)-178 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet. 515) 214 (1832).
9. 420 F. Supp. at 1130.
10. See, e.g., Logan v. Andrus, 457 F. Supp. 1318 (N.D. Okla. 1978).
[Vol. 15:863
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Court opinions upholding imposition of state inheritance taxes on re-
stricted Indian property 1 may be best explained as instances of the
Supreme Court tacitly recognizing state domination of Indian affairs in
an era of dormant tribal government. In fact, in one of those cases, the
Court made reference to the fact that the state was supplying services to
the Indians. 2 By contrast, modem cases involving more active tribal
governments have resulted in exclusion of various forms of state taxa-
tion. 3 It is no coincidence that recent decisions denying Oklahoma
criminal jurisdiction on trust allotments 14 have come at the same time
as cases reinstating Oklahoma Indians' tribal governments.
Understanding Indian law has never been a matter of isolating
cases and statutes from Indian experience and the actions of federal
bureaucrats. 5 Professor Strickland offers lawyers insight into those
phenomena in their past and present form, through his rich narrative,
fascinating photographs, and an extremely valuable bibliographic es-
say.
11. West v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 334 U.S. 717 (1948); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. United
States, 319 U.S. 598 (1943).
12. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. United States, 319 U.S. 598, 608-10 (1943).
13. See, e.g., Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
14. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. Littlechief, 573 P.2d 263 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978).
15. See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW XXVII-XXVIII (1941) (Introduc-
tion by Solicitor Nathan R. Margold). "Federal Indian law is a subject that cannot be understood
if the historical dimension is ignored.... History and analysis need to be supplemented by an
understanding of the actual functioning of legal rules and concepts, the actual consequences of
statutes and decisions." Id.
1980]
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LAWYERS' ETHICS. Edited by Allan Gerson. New Brunswick, New
Jersey: Transaction Books. 1980. Pp. x, 279. $17.95
Reviewed by Donald R. Joseph*
The ethics of the legal profession are currently the subject of both
public and professional scrutiny. Traditional conceptions of the
boundaries of ethical conduct of a lawyer have been increasingly ques-
tioned. The Code of Professional Responsibility, which became effec-
tive in 1970,1 has for some time been criticized as outmoded and
insufficient. In response to that criticism, the Commission on Evalua-
tion of Professional Standards of the American Bar Association is now
circulating for public comment a Discussion Draft of Model Rules of
Professional Conduct,2 which, if adopted by the ABA, would replace
the Code. The publication of Lawyers'Ethics, a selection of articles on
a variety of legal ethics issues, is therefore particularly timely. The
works selected for inclusion in Lawyers' Ethics, like the Model Rules,
present not only questions that have recently arisen, but also those that
have troubled the profession for some time.
A quick review of the contents of Lawyers' Ethics discloses both
the variety of issues addressed and the stature of the authors addressing
them-authors ranging from Alexis de Tocqueville to Jimmy Carter.
* B.A. University of Oklahoma; J.D. University of Texas; Associate with the firm Conner,
Winters, Ballaine, Barry & McGowen, Tulsa, Oklahoma.
1. The Code of Professional Responsibility [hereinafter cited as the CODE] became effective
on January 1, 1970 for members of the American Bar Association. Membership in that organiza-
tion is not mandatory. Almost every state, however, has adopted a code of ethics substantially
similar, if not identical, to the CODE. The Oklahoma version of the CODE was enacted as 5 OKLA.
STAT. ch. I, app. 3 (1971), as amended.
2. 48 U.S.L.W. 1 (Supp. Feb. 19, 1980) [hereinafter cited as the Model Rules).
This Discussion Draft has been authorized to be circulated for comment but has not
been adopted or approved by the House of Delegates and does not represent policy of
the American Bar Association.
The text remains under study by the Commission and is open for further revision.
Comments and suggestion for revision are invited and should be submitted to the Com-
mission's Reporter, Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Yale University Law School, New
Haven, Connecticut 06520.
The preceding two paragraphs are included at the request of the Commission on Evaluation
of Professional Standards in the Model Rules [hereinafter referred to as the Commission].
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The articles chosen also make clear the fact that the intention of the
editor was not to compile either a defense of present ethical guidelines
or a "how-to" manual for the legal profession, but instead to consider
some of the major problems now facing the profession, as well as to
analyze some of the basic assumptions upon which our legal system is
premised. 3
The book progresses from the general to the specific: from the role
of the legal profession in American society to the unique ethical diffi-
culties confronting certain specialized segments of the bar. The first
article, an essay by Alexis de Tocqueville,4 cannot be dismissed as sim-
ply of historical interest. Although written almost 150 years ago, its
observations are often echoed today. Characterizing the judicial bench
and the bar as "the American aristocracy,"' 5 de Tocqueville considered
them generally to be "opponents of innovation" 6 and the "sole inter-
preter[s] of an occult science."7 Certainly, a part of his analysis is no
longer valid,' but de Tocqueville's perception of the legal profession as
a conservative elite exercising political power greatly disproportionate
to its numbers is hardly an unfamiliar viewpoint.
Also included in the section concerning the role of the legal profes-
sion is a speech by President Carter to the Los Angeles County Bar
Association 9 which is representative of the criticisms currently being
leveled at the bar. It would be too easy to dismiss the President's
charges as overly general or simplistic, though that point could perhaps
be made. No great controversy is likely to result, for example, from his
statements that criminal justice should be faster and fairer, that the law
should be impartial and honest, or that litigation is over-emphasized
and delay-ridden."t In pursuit of those unimpeachable goals, however,
3. In keeping with that questioning it might have been appropriate to include more articles
by non-lawyers; almost all of the 28 authors named are lawyers.
4. The United States: A Unique Government of Lawyers, de Tocqueville, in LAWYERS' ETH-
ics 3 (A. Gerson ed. 1980) (excerpted from A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMocRACY IN AMERICA (1835).
5. LAWYERS' ETHiCS, supra, note 4 at 7.
6. Id. at 4.
7. Id. at 6.
8. He characterizes the judiciary as having the "'instincts of the privileged classes." It is
difficult to argue that Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), to choose only two of many possible examples, were decided in the
interest of the privileged classes. Unfortunately, the comment that "the lawyers form the only
enlightened class whom the people do not mistrust," LAwYERS' ETmcs, supra, note 4 at 9, is also
outdated.
9. The speech also served, coincidentally, as a vehicle for the President to promote certain
reforms which he advocates in the legal system. The speech was delivered on May 4, 1978. Id. at
273.
10. Id. at 19-20.
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he makes a number of specific proposals which are worthy of consider-
ation, e.g., uniform sentencing standards for federal offenses and a
"lobby reform bill."'1I Some of the President's comments may seem
untenable u or even contradictory, 13 but are in any event thought-pro-
voking. 14
Professor Auerbach's article 5 returns to the themes expressed by
de Tocqueville and carries them several steps further. He begins by
asserting that the legal profession has "failed to relate the legal process
to the purpose of justice,"' 6  and has "aligned itself with privilege
rather than justice."' 17 To Professor Auerbach, much of the Code and
the ethical precepts underlying it, as well as the substance and process
of legal education, are the result of an active conspiracy among mem-
11. Id. at 21-22.
12. For example, the President singles out for criticism the increasing number of medical
malpractice suits. Id. at 19. Such suits, like those under Rule lOb-5, 28 U.S.C. § 1983, or any
other theory of liability, are subject to abuse; but the evolution of a cause of action for medical
malpractice represents only the application of a well-established standard of care to a previously
insulated profession. One solution to the problem of frivolous lawsuits that President Carter
might have proposed is the award of attorney's fees to the victorious party in a greater range of
cases.
13. While decrying society's over-reliance on litigation, the President argues for fewer proce-
dural barriers in class actions and a broader definition of standing to bring suit. Id. at 22. Such
changes would undoubtedly result in both an increase in litigation and in the dependence upon
litigation, rather than other methods, to achieve certain desired ends.
14. Two of the President's most telling points are that "interminable delay" is sometimes
produced in litigation which "can often mean victory on one side," id at 18; and that "too often
the amount ofjustice that a person gets depends on the amount of money that he or she can pay."
Id. at 22. Again, even if overstated, there is undeniably more than a little truth in these state-
ments. Lawyers should be concerned not only that such problems exist, but that the President of
the United States is convinced that they exist.
One of the most controversial innovations of the Model Rules is sure to be its provision
concerning pro bonopublico legal services. The Introduction to Model Rules 8.1 states, "A lawyer
may properly be expected to contribute time and effort to civic undertakings in general and to
improvement in the administration of law in particular."
A lawyer shall render unpaid public interest legal service. A lawyer may discharge this
responsibility by service in activities for improving the law, the legal system, or the legal
profession, or by providing professional services to persons of limited means or to public
service groups or organizations. A lawyer shall make an annual report concerning such
service to appropriate regulatory authority.
Model Rules 8.1 (emphasis added). The proposed rule leaves several questions unanswered, such
as the amount of service required, the use to be made of the information received by the "appro-
priate regulatory authority," and even the constitutional implications of mandatory pro bono serv-
ice. The proposed rule is nevertheless a radical departure from the current recommendations
contained in the CODE to "participate in serving the disadvantaged" and "support all proper ef-
forts to meet this need for legal services." CODE, EC 2-25. The debate over mandatory pro bono
work has already begun. See 66 A.B.A.J. 280 (March, 1980).
15. Auerbach, Access to the Legal System in Historical Perspective, in LAWYERS' ETHICS,
supra note 4, at 29 (excerpted from J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL
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bers of corporate law firms to perpetuate their own social and political
interests.18 Although one may disagree with his conclusions, the ques-
tions raised-self-interest, social origins, financial resources and their
effect upon equal justice-are valid ones. The critique 19 following the
excerpt from Unequal Justice makes several equally valid points, such
as demonstrating that most major law school curricula hardly indicate
an undue influence by corporate law firms.
Professor Dershowitz, in his response to the role of legal education
in the abuses alleged in Unequal Justice, contributes the timely obser-
vation that most law school ethics courses confine themselves to the
official ethics of the ABA. Such instruction is of course necessary, since
the primary goal (in fact, if not in theory) is to enable students to pass
the state bar examination section on legal ethics. Courses in the subject
should, however, be of a broader scope. The function of law schools is
not simply to train technicians,2" but to educate members of a profes-
sion entrusted with the responsibility of shaping and protecting the le-
gal rights enjoyed in our society. The method of critical analysis and
reasoning taught in other law school courses is perhaps even more ap-
propriate in a study of the rules governing the duties owed by the law-
yer to the pursuit of justice, to society, to the legal system, to his client,
and to himself or herself.2'
That critical analysis might well be turned toward the foundation
of the American legal structure, the adversary system. In a detailed
and absorbing historical study of the evolution of the adversary sys-
tem,22 the authors effectively dispel the notion that the adversary sys-
tem is "best" or that its arrival was somehow inevitable. After tracing
its antecedents in ancient Greek, Roman, and medieval English socie-
ties, and the effect upon it of the American colonial experience, Neef
18. Id., passim.
19. Bishop, Against the Bar: A Critique ofProfessorAuerbach's Views, id. at 38.
20. Judge Frank's essay is not to the contrary. Frank, LegalEducation, in LAWYERS' ETHICS,
supra note 4 at 46. While contending that legal education should endeavor to provide more prac-
tical experiences in preparation for a career as a lawyer, he also exhorts law schools to "interest
[themselves] mightily, as most of our law schools do not, in the problem of thoroughly overhaul-
ing our trial methods, and in the ability of many litigants to obtain justice because of lack of
money to meet the expense of obtaining crucial testimony." Id. at 50.
21. The Model Rules have specifically attempted to expand upon and reconcile the duties
surrounding the other roles of the lawyer in addition to his role as advocate. Sections A.1. through
A.6. are entitled, respectively, "Client-Lawyer Relationship," "Adviser," "Advocate," "Negotia-
tor," "Intermediary Between Clients" and "Legal Evaluator." It might well be argued that the list
is incomplete.
22. Neef& Nagel, The Adversary Nature of the American Legal Systenz A Historical Perspec-
live, in LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 4, at 73.
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and Nagel summarize four theories offered to explain the solidification
of the adversary system in the United States.23 Even the most devoted
advocate of the adversary system must, upon reflecting on these theo-
ries, acknowledge that some of the underpinnings of the adversary sys-
tem may not be as logical or indispensable as were once thought. One
especially noteworthy comment is that in an ideal adversary system, the
least skillful antagonist should lose the dispute.2 4 While this may com-
port with the laissez-faire notion of individualism and competition, it
offers a less than satisfying rationale for the determination of justice
between litigants.
The controversy over the interrelationship of truth, justice (how-
ever those terms may be defined), and the adversary system continues
with Judge Frankel's article. His central premise is that the system
rates truth too low among the values that institutions of justice are
meant to serve.25 The corollary to that premise is that the duty owed
the client is given too high a value. In the course of his article, Judge
Frankel questions whether many of the premises of the adversary sys-
tem are realistic: that two relatively equally qualified lawyers, by thor-
ough preparation and intense advocacy of their clients' positions, will
cause all relevant evidence to be produced for the court; and that pres-
entation of the two most extreme interpretations of a dispute will en-
able the court to arrive at the more likely middle ground, with little or
no intervention in the fact finding (as opposed to fact determination)
process. 26 He touches on a variety of other topics, including the rela-
23. "They are: (1) the fight theory; (2) the sporting, or game theory; (3) the laissez-faire
theory; and (4) the ritual theory." Id. at 85.
24. Id. at 87. Even under the CODE, however, the extremely unskilled antagonist (and thus
his client) is not left to his fate. A lawyer in litigation is bound to disclose legal authority in the
controlling jurisdiction known to be directly adverse to his client which is not disclosed by oppos-
ing counsel. CODE DR 7-106(B)(1). See also Model Rules 3.1(c) (must advise tribunal of "legal
authority known to the lawyer that would probably have a substantial effect on the determination
of a material issue").
The Commission was sensitive to the possibility that the system is not infallible in producing
all relevant facts for consideration by the court. "When an adversary has failed to present such a
fact [ie., a "probably decisive" fact, "one that opposing counsel clearly should have presented"],
the system manifestly has suffered breakdown." Model Rules, Comment to Rule 3.1. The Model
Rules stop short of requiring disclosure of all such facts, however, and impose a duty to disclose
only if required by law or the Model Rules, if necessary to correct a manifest misapprehension
resulting from a previous representation the lawyer has made to the tribunal. Model Rules 3.1(d).
This obligation is modified as to criminal defense lawyers, see Model Rules, 3.1(0 and prosecu-
tors, see Model Rules 3.1(g), 3.10.
25. Frankel, The Searchfor Truth: An Umpireal View, in LAWYERS' ETHICs, supra note 4, at
99, 100.
26. One aspect of the judicial process not considered by Judge Frankel or the other selections
in LAWYERS' ETHics is the role of the jury and, in particular, the schizophrenic attitude of the
[Vol. 15:868
18
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 15 [1979], Iss. 4, Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol15/iss4/8
19801 BOOK REVIEWS
tive merit of the European inquisitorial system,27 certification of trial
28 A~ velawyers, and his view of the ethical rationalizations and shortcomings
resulting from the role of the lawyer in the adversary system.29 Here,
as throughout Lawyers' Ethics, opposing viewpoints are presented.30
Professor Freedman endorses the premises mentioned above3' and con-
tends that truth cannot be an absolute value because of our concern for
the dignity of the individual. The privilege against self-incrimination
and the presumption of innocence, for example, are considered of para-
mount importance despite their potential conflict with the search for
truth in a criminal trial.3a
By including two opinions on the availability of the attorney-client
privilege to a criminal defendant upon the facts considered in People v.
Belge,33 the editor attempts to clarify the ethical duties of the criminal
defense lawyer. Harmonizing ethical directives with the law of attor-
ney-client privilege is an ongoing dilemma, epitomized by Belge. 34 It
has been argued that the privilege must be limited if the client is en-
gaged in a continuing crime.35 In further justification of disclosure, the
duties of the attorney to avoid even the appearance of professional im-
propriety36 and to refrain from assisting the client in conduct known to
be illegal are cited.37 The response, equally substantiated under the
Code,38 is that the constitutional right to counsel and the privilege
American legal system toward juries. Although we adulate the jury as the cornerstone of democ-
racy and the repository of justice, we exhibit our mistrust of the jury's ability by continually re-
stricting the evidence it is allowed to consider.
27. LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 4, at 105, 107.
28. Id. at 109.
29. Id. at 104.
30. Freedman, Judge Frankel's Searchfor Truth, LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra, note 4 at 124. See
also Professor Uviller's interesting discussion of some of the implications of these ideas, id. at 130.
Professor Freedman's views on the duty of the lawyer to his client and the potentially conflicting
moral obligations may also be found elsewhere in LAWYERS' ETHICS. Id. at 63.
31. Id. at 127.
32. Id. at 126.
33. 50 A.D.2d 1088, 376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (App. Div. 1975).
34. The defendant in a murder case, Garrow, was represented by two court-appointed attor-
neys, one of whom was Mr. Beige. Garrow disclosed to them the location of two other victims he
had admittedly killed. The attorneys, after finding and photographing the bodies, refused to di-
vulge the location of the remains until Garrow, in his testimony in another case, implicated him-
self in the slayings. By doing so, the attorneys concluded that Garrow had waived the attorney-
client privilege of confidentiality. LAWYERS' ETmICS, supra note 4, at 145, 156-57.
35. Habin & Jensen, The Impropriety of the Attorneys'Actions in the Lake Pleasant Case in
LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 4, at 145, 148-49.
36. CODE, Canon 9.
37. CODE, DR 7-102(A)(7).
38. CODE, DR 4-101(B). But see CODE, DR 4-101(C), stating that a lawyer may reveal confi-
dences when permitted by the Disciplinary Rules. This suggests the application of DR 7-
102(A)(7). The controversy obviously is not resolved by the CODE.
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against self-incrimination cannot be compromised in this situation; the
lawyer is prohibited from knowingly revealing information protected
by the attorney-client privilege.39 The Model Rules recognize the con-
flict and rely on the applicable law of attorney-client privilege as the
standard for ethical conduct of the defense lawyer."
An equally difficult problem, one which has long vexed the legal.
profession, is that of a client's perjury in a criminal case. The editor
has included two brief considerations of the issue.4 1  As discussed
therein, whether the duty of the lawyer to represent his client zealously
includes knowlingly cooperating in perjury is by no means certain.
The Code, aside from its own internal ambiguity,42 must also be con-
sidered in conjunction with the constitutional rights of a criminal de-
fendant.43  The time at which the contemplated perjury arises can
present other problems. The lawyer, after learning of his client's inten-
tion to perjure himself, faces very different considerations if the trial
has already begun." The Model Rules again determine that the ethical
rules must ultimately look to the applicable law in the jurisdiction on
due process and the right to counsel.45
The next section of Lawyer's Ethics is devoted to a study of the
39. Callahan & Pitkow, The Proprety ofthe Attorneys'Actions in the Lake Pleasant Case, in
LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 4, at 156.
40. "A lawyer for a defendant in a criminal case:
(1) is not required to apprise the prosecutor or the tribunal of evidence adverse to the accused,
except as law may otherwise provide;
(2) may not disclose facts as required by paragraph (d) [see note 24, supra] .... " Model
Rules 3.1(f); see also Model Rules 1.7. Other provisions of the Model Rules, however, can be
cited in support of a different result under certain circumstances. See, e.g., Model Rules 3.4 and
3.11.
41. Pino, Attempting to Regulate Perjurious Testimony: The Massachusetts Experience, in
LAWYERS' ETHICS supra note 4, at 183, and Pickett, Perjury. Stay In or Pull Out?, id. at 187.
42. Compare CODE EC 7-5, DR 7-101(B)(2), DR 7-102(A)(4)-(8), and DR 7-102(B) with EC
4-I, DR 4-101, DR 7-101(A)(3), and EC 7-1.
43. "A criminal accused has a right to the assistance of an advocate, a right to testify on his
own behalf, and a right of confidential communication with counsel. However, an accused should
not have a right to assistance of counsel in committing perjury." Model Rules, Comment to Rule
3.1. But see note 45 infra.
44. See note 42 supra, CODE DR 2-109 and DR 2-110.
45. The criminal defense lawyer "shall offer evidence regardless of belief as to whether it is
false if the client so demands and applicable law requires that the lawyer comply with such a
demand." Model Rules 3.1(f)(3); see also Comment to Rule 3.1., id.
In a civil case the question is resolved somewhat differently under the Model Rules.
Except as provided in paragraph () [concerning the criminal defense lawyer], ifa lawyer
discovers that evidence or testimony presented by the lawyer is false, the lawyer shall
disclose that fact and take suitable measures to rectify the consequences, even if doing so
requires the disclosure that the client is implicated in the falsification.
Model Rules 3.1(d). The judgment of the Commission is that the possible sense of betrayal felt by
the client, loss of the case and prosecution for perjury are outweighed by the necessity to avoid
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petition of Alger Hiss for reinstatement to the Massachusetts bar.16
The case revolves around the requirement of good moral character as a
condition to the practice of law, and, by extension, the internal regula-
tion of the legal profession. Particular ethical matters facing the Wash-
ington lawyer47 and the international lawyer,48 and a comparative
review of certain ethical principles of medical and legal professions49
conclude the book. Each contributes to the purpose served by Lawyers'
Ethics-to pose questions about the present structure of the legal com-
munity and heighten the sensitivity of its readers to ethical controver-
sies present in every aspect of the profession.
Mr. Gerson's collection is neither an exhaustive consideration of
all major ethical issues now before the profession, nor a completely
detailed treatment of any one issue. Yet it achieves a valuable balance
between the two. Lawyers' Ethics does not provide any sure answers,
but presents a multitude of questions, usually with more than one opin-
ion on each. These are questions too often swept aside or ignored com-
pletely not only in law school legal ethics courses, but by the members
of the bar as well. Professor Dershowitz would have his students in
legal ethics read Unequal Justice before reading the Code: 0 Should I
teach such a class, I would rather my students read Lawyers' Ethics.
deceiving the court and subverting the judicial process. Model Rules, Comment to Rule 3.1. See
also Model Rules 1.4, 1.7 and 3.11.
The CODE and Model Rules recognize that a criminal prosecutor plays a unique role in the
criminal justice system. CODE EC 7-103; Model Rules 3.10.
46. The brief on behalf of Mr. Hiss and the judgment of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court reinstating him are reproduced in LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 4, at 193 and 209. A
commentary follows on the effect of the Hiss decision and the same court's action with regard to
Charles W. Colson, former counsel to Richard Nixon. Brown, Reinstatement Dilemma: The Hiss
Decision and Its Effects Upon Discplinary Enforcement, id. at 225.
47. Kampelman, The Washington Lawyer: Some Musings, id. at 239. See also CODE EC 9-3;
DR 9-101(B), (C).
48. Gwirtzman, The International Lawyer: Extra-territorial Application of Professional Re-
sponsibility Standards, in LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 4, at 251.
49. Norton, Ethics in Medicine and Law: Standards and Conflicts, id. at 259. The Oklahoma
Bar and Medical Associations have adopted a Medical-Legal Interprofessional Code. 51 O.B.J.
170 (Jan. 26, 1980).
50. Id. at 44.
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